Albanian clans are involved in criminal activities in both Italy’s northern and southern regions. Of the mafias of foreign origin (such as the Russian, the Chinese and the Nigerian), the Albanian mafia is considered the most powerful organisation operating in Italy.

Research suggests that four principal stimuli have favoured the development of Albanian organised crime.⁵⁶ First, the break-up in 1985 of the Italo-American heroin distribution network on the east coast of the US known as the ‘Pizza Connection’ allowed newcomers to break into the market, thus permitting groups of ethnic Albanians to move from low level criminal activities into independent operations. Second, the rise to political power of Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic in the late 1980s caused the progressive diminution of influence of the Albanian majority in the province of Kosovo. Milosevic removed all ethnic Albanians from the Kosovar parliament, and in 1989 withdrew the province’s autonomous status altogether. As a result, clandestine groups of nationalist rebels were formed in Kosovo and within the Albanian émigré populations abroad – in Switzerland, where some 100,000 ethnic Albanians reside, and in cities such as Frankfurt, Brussels and Paris.⁵⁷ Activities were coordinated by a mafia-type organisation, based on Albanian traditions of loyalty to the extended family and clans, known as fares, and by the notion of bessa, or absolute respect for verbal promises. Fund-raising was carried out through activities such as drugs and arms trafficking, smuggling of contraband cigarettes, and unofficial ‘taxation’ of the Albanian community abroad. It has been estimated that émigré remittances totalled around US$ 300–500 million per annum or about 15–20 percent of official Albanian GDP in 1995.⁵⁸

The third factor was the collapse of communism in Albania and the ensuing transition to a free market economy. Deregulation and the privatisation of former state assets were exploited by those who came to power under the Berisha government in March 1992, when an increasingly corrupt élite began to appropriate the country’s land and other assets. As soon as he came to office, Berisha ensured that the native Gheg clans or fares from the northern part of the country to which he belonged were given control of all the country’s key posts in the ministries, the police and the secret police (SHIK), whose principal objective was to neutralise the political opposition represented by the Socialist Party.⁵⁹ The state arms company, Meico, was sold off in 1994 to the largest privately-owned Albanian company, Vefa Holdings, whose controversial chairman, Vehbi Allmucaj, was a close personal friend of Defence Minister Safet Zhulali. Allmucaj was the single largest donor to Berisha’s Democratic Party in the May 1996 parliamentary elections, which took place against a background of considerable electoral bribery.⁶⁰

The fourth and perhaps most influential factor was the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had been an important stretch in the so-called Balkan route of heroin distribution, along which 75 percent of all heroin destined for Western European markets travelled. In order to avoid the war zone, trafficking networks re-directed heroin consignments through Turkey and Greece into Macedonia. Part of the Kosovo mafia moved into Albania and West Macedonia, where two heroin processing plants were established,⁶¹ and strengthened ties with its Turkish counterpart. By the mid 1990s, ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia were fully integrated into the new Balkan route and were major suppliers to markets in Austria, Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Belgium.

Moreover the increasing importance of Caucasian heroin production – run by Georgian and Armenian mafias, who distrusted their Turkish counterparts – also favoured the Albanians. In 1996, Albanian traffickers were thought to be almost the sole suppliers to the Swiss market, with annual profits estimated at close to US$ 33 million. The success of the Albanian networks gradually brought them into conflict with the Turkish gangs and this in turn led to their greater visibility for law enforcement agencies. Some 800 ethnic Albanians were arrested for heroin trafficking in Germany in 1996, making Albanians the second most numerous nationality in terms of arrests after Turks.⁶² Albanians were also the nationality most frequently arrested for heroin trafficking in Switzerland in 1996.⁶³

The international embargo on Serbia and Montenegro and Greece’s embargo on Macedonia – both consequences of the Balkan conflict – turned Albania into the centre of a vast sanctions-busting operation in which the distinctions between state-run criminality, corruption and mafia became almost indistinguishable. Activities included the smuggling of embargoed oil to Serbia and Montenegro, arms trafficking, handling of stolen vehicles, drug trafficking and large-scale immigrant smuggling. The chairman of the company which had the monopoly on petrol distribution in Albania during the period of the oil embargoes against Serbia and Montenegro, Tritan Shehu, was also the chairman of the Democratic Party. A former Interior Minister, Agon Musaraj, was accused of systematically facilitating breaches of the international embargo against Montenegro, as well as supervising a drugs network and was forced to resign after the 1996 election. Defence Minister Safet Zhulali, long suspected of involvement in drugs, oil and contraband cigarette smuggling, money laundering and trafficking arms to Bosnia, held on to his post until the 1997 collapse.⁶⁴ Corruption became endemic, and little or nothing was done to apprehend big time criminals, who had no fear of being held accountable for their crimes. Domestic crime also surged, particularly in urban areas.

In February 1993, several members of the Mannino clan of Cosa Nostra were arrested in Milan. They were running a large-scale international arms trafficking network using Albanian and Croatian couriers to import arms destined for southern Italy from the territories of the former Yugoslavia. In the same year, Albania was described as ‘a centre of distribution for drugs and weapons from Greece and Turkey’ by Italian authorities, who noted that ‘traditional links’ for contraband cigarette traffic between the United Holy Crown and Albanian gangs were being exploited. The ‘special relationship’ between the two was considered proven by the ‘presence, in ever larger numbers, of individuals from the Salento and Brindisi area with new and varied economic activities in Albanian cities’.⁶⁹ Moreover, known criminals of the UHC are likely to go into hiding in Albania, from were they can easily rely on the local mafia to maintain control of illegal activities.

Proof of Italo-Albanian cooperation in international drug trafficking emerged in May 1994, when Macedonian and Italian authorities completed the first phase of ‘Operation Macedonia’, a ten-month intensive surveillance of known Kosovar Albanians and other drug traffickers based in Macedonia, resulting in the seizure of 42 kilograms of heroin. The second phase of this operation in late 1994/early 1995 led to the arrest in Skopje of several members of the UHC and other Italian nationals who had entered Macedonia from Albania. Another instance of criminal cooperation was the arrest (November 1996), again in Apulia, of 16 Italians and 5 Albanians, accused of organised crime for international drug trafficking.⁷²

Seventy percent of the heroin trafficking directed to Switzerland and Germany takes the Albanian route controlled by the local mafia.⁷³ Whilst the largest share of heroin brought into Italy enters by road from the north-east, some is brought by sea from Durres, where the Albanian mafia is thought to control a number of merchant shipping and other marine companies. Arms, drugs and contraband cigarettes are transported along the same routes and by the same means of transport, as was shown by an operation known as ‘Sol Levante’ of 12 May 1995, which led to the discovery in Lecce of a network of traffickers led by a member of the United Holy Crown for the transportation of drugs from Turkey and the Middle East, with the Italian market as final destination.⁷⁴

In recent years, there has been a massive expansion of traditional Albanian cannabis cultivation in the south, around the towns of Delvina, Permetti and Saranda, of which nearly all is believed to be exported to Italy. Official sources state that over 8 metric tons of cannabis derivatives (hashish oil or marijuana) were seized in Italy between July 1996 and May 1997.⁷⁵ Over 400 kilograms were intercepted in a single seizure near the port of Otranto in early July 1997, when police arrested 11 individuals, including two Albanians, all charged with international drug trafficking. The massive growth in cannabis cultivation is primarily due to the economic crisis in the country, but also to the actions taken by Greece against cannabis cultivation in the Peloponnese and Thessaly, which have caused plantations to be re-located in Albania.⁷⁶ When one considers that the decollectivisation of formerly state-owned land created very small farming units (one hectare, in many instances, split up into several plots often at some distance from each other), barely sufficient for home consumption, one can see why Albanian farmers would look to cannabis as a providential, lucrative investment.

Greece has also tightened up on immigration controls, and expelled more than a million illegal immigrants in the four years to 1997, most of them several times over. As a result, a more professional immigrant smuggling network has been set up, composed of Greeks and Albanians who also engage in cannabis trafficking. Marijuana exports to Greece reached such a scale that Greek Interior Minister Giorgios Romeos wrote a report to the European Union about cannabis cultivation in Albania and its connection with the immigrant smuggling mafia. Romeos’ report noted that other drugs were involved besides marijuana: at least two significant hauls of several hundred kilograms of cocaine in the Greek port of Patras in 1996 were destined for transit through Albania.

Albanians run this criminal activity in collaboration with the Italian mafia. Trafficking in illegal immigrants to be exploited for prostitution, initially limited to the southern region of Apulia, has rapidly spread to the central and northern regions (Latium, Tuscany, Emilia Romagna, Marche, Liguria, Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto).

In the south of Italy, where the mafia organisations are more deeply- rooted, there seem to be very few Albanians prosecuted for exploitation of prostitution; at the same time, many Albanian women illegal immigrants work as prostitutes. The discrepancy is most probably due to a sort of ‘territorial division of labour’ agreed upon at the highest levels of the Albanian and Italian mafias; in other parts of Italy prostitution rackets instead seem to be firmly in the hands of Albanians.

Funds from illicit trafficking and sanctions-busting activities constituted a major element of the liquidity of the pyramid schemes that collapsed in early 1997. These banks were government supported, guarded by the state police force and advertised on television. With the end of war in the former Yugoslavia and the lifting of international embargoes, the flow of cash into the pyramid schemes slowed down, especially after the International Monetary Fund issued warnings about their viability in October 1996. At this point, members of the Italian Camorra and United Holy Crown are thought to have replaced the sanctions busters as new suppliers of cash. The banks were still solvent at the end of 1996 (after about US$ 4.5 billion had passed through them) but gradually became less safe, thanks to scrutiny from banking authorities. In order to entice the more gullible Albanian savers, the banks raised interest rates and then allegedly transferred all the money deposited over the previous six months (about US$ 500–800 million) into the accounts of Italian and Albanian criminal organisations. These funds were then invested in Western countries. The ‘pyramids’ of southern Albania are thought to have invested mainly in medium-sized Italian firms in the form of joint ventures, some of which were subsequently investigated by the Italian authorities.

Foreigners seem to be particularly active in illegal immigration trafficking, as they are able to offer services such as fake documents and means of transportation, and can facilitate contacts once the host country has been reached.⁸⁰ To date, illegal immigration to Italy is mainly managed by Albanian clans, in collaboration with the Italian mafias and other criminal groups controlled by ethnic clans. The Albanian ports of Durres and Vlora have been used for several years as departure points for illegal immigration into and through Italy, not only of East Europeans (Albanians, Macedonians, Serbs and Montenegrins) but also of other nationalities. The Chinese triads bring Filipinos, Sri Lankans and Chinese nationals to Albania, while the Turkish mafia moves Kurds, Pakistanis and other nationalities, most of whom are bound for Germany. The involvement of these organised crime groups was illustrated by the arrest in Lecce on 12 April 1995 of Li Wiei Xian, head of the ‘Green Dragon’ triad and the identification in Milan of a coordinating structure; and by the capture in Lecce on 19 April 1995 of Turkish Mafia boss Ismail Budak, leader of a criminal organisation formed to manage transport of illegal immigrants (especially Kurds) who after disembarkation in Italy, were taken to San Remo in the Liguria region and then on to France and Germany. ⁸¹

Formerly, Italian organised crime groups handled the distribution of immigrants over Italian territory, but since 1995–1996 it appears that such arrangements have been transferred to members of the particular ethnic group who are resident in Italy. The most recent evidence suggests that Italian criminal organisations make a profit on the disembarkation of immigrants in the territory under their control but allow ethnic nationals to arrange onward transport for illegal immigrants and to run prostitution rackets, while in exchange they retain total control of the heroin and arms traffic, which they consider more remunerative. In November 1997, a major Italian newspaper came out with the title, ‘The Trade-Slaver of the Otranto Channel has been Captured’, to announce the results of ‘Operation Amarildo’: a clan of 16 Albanians was discovered, of whom nine were arrested, and seven were identified and wanted. The boss, an Albanian married to an Italian woman and resident in Fasano (Brindisi) since 1991, ran an organisation dealing with drug trafficking (marijuana), illegal immigration and prostitution.⁸²

The Albanian networks are concentrated in the Vlora area, from where immigrants are brought to the stretch of coast between San Cataldo di Lecce and Otranto by powerful motor boats. They are subsequently taken to the railway stations and then head for central and northern Italy and other European countries. Until the March 1997 crisis, would-be immigrants paid around 1.5 million lire (US$ 1,000) to make the crossing.

Illegal immigrants wishing to stay in Italy are sent to places where they can best be exploited, especially through involvement in crimes related to drugs and prostitution. The link between clandestine immigration and drug trafficking has been reinforced with the more recent waves of immigration to Italy because immigrants are able to offset the costs of their trip by becoming drug couriers. Limited distribution is permitted by the Italian organised crime groups, subject to payment of a levy.⁸³

Organisation of onward travel is thought to be handled by the women of the UHC, particularly as regards the placing of babies and children. For example, they enter into agreements with families for illegal adoption, and look after the babies upon arrival in Italy.⁸⁴ Minors may be handed over to criminal organisations or to would-be adoptive parents. Otherwise they have to beg, live off petty crime or, as happens with most females, become prostitutes. Almost all cases of exploitation of under-age prostitution investigated by the police have been attributed to foreigners, mainly Albanians. The trafficking of minors aged 14 to 17 reduced to slavery was discovered in the cities of Rome and Milan in 1996; several Albanians were arrested and charged with kidnapping, extortion, exploitation of prostitution and immigration law offences.⁸⁵

⁵⁶Xhudo, G., ‘Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity’, Transnational Organised Crime, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 1–20.

⁵⁷Drug Trafficking in Albania, op. cit., p. 21.

⁵⁸Ibidem, p. 10.

⁵⁹Ibidem, p. 7

⁶⁰Ibidem, p. 9.

⁶²Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, No. 32, June 1994.

⁶²Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, No. 57, July 1996, and No. 66, April 1997.

⁶³ICPO–Interpol. Data provided at the ‘Interpol Heroin Conference’, Genoa, June 1997.

⁶⁴When allegations about him to this effect were published by the British newspaper The Independent in February 1997, Zhulali initially responded by threatening to serve a libel writ on the newspaper, but later acknowledged in an interview with the BBC Albanian service that the accusations were substantially true. He agreed that the government was ‘directly responsible’ for the collapsed pyramid banks and confirmed accusations made by the opposition that the Democratic party had tried to arm its supporters at the height of the anti-government rebellion in early March.

⁶⁵Drug Trafficking in Albania, op. cit., p. 11.

⁶⁶The Independent, 12 June 1997.

⁶⁷Interview with judge Nicola Piacente, Narcomafie, Gruppo Abele, Torino, July–August 1995.

⁶⁸Ministero dell’Interno, Rapporto sul Fenomeno della Criminalità Organizzata, Anno 1992, pp. 123–24.

⁶⁹Ministero dell’Interno, Rapporto sul Fenomeno della Criminalità Organizzata, Anno 1993, p. 288.

⁷⁰Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Relazione Semestrale, December 1995, p. 33.

⁷¹Ministero dell’Interno 1997, op. cit., p. 437.

⁷²Ibidem.

⁷³Ibidem, p. 436.

⁷⁴Ministero dell’Interno 1996, op. cit., p. 326.

⁷⁵Drugs and Organised Crime Liaison Officer, British Embassy Rome, personal communication.

⁷⁶Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, No. 66, April 1997.

⁷⁷Giancane, S., ‘Nuovi Soggetti al Mercato’, in Aspe, No. 15–16, pp. 18–21.

⁷⁸La Repubblica, 24 December 1997.

⁷⁹Sette, supplement of Corriere della Sera, 26 June 1997.

⁸⁰Transcrime, Migrazione e Criminalità. La Dimensione Internazionale del Problema, Milano, Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale, 1996, p. 53.

⁸¹Ministero dell’Interno 1996, op. cit., p. 327.